Update 24 March 2024: Added Sea Legend and Oceanic fires to the map.
Update 04 May 2024: Added Sea World I and Sea Safari VII to the map.
Update 27 June 2024: Added Sea Sound/Exocet to the map.
Update 26 July 2024: Added Myna-1 to the map
Update 26 October 2024: Added Seaduction to the map
Update 07 November 2024: Added Blue Voyager and Nouran fires to the map
Update 19 November 2024: Nautilus One added, Sea Legend accident date corrected
Update 25 November 2024: Sea Story added to the map
Update 31 December 2024: Ocean Pure 1
Update 04 February 2025: KM Putri Papua added to the map
Update 06 February 2025: Triton added to the map
The sleek, modern appearance of many diving liveaboard vessels might suggest cutting-edge safety measures comparable to those of larger passenger ships, such as cruise liners. However, it is essential to recognize that the vast majority of liveaboard vessels are smaller than 500 gross tons and typically operate in domestic waters, exempting them from the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
SOLAS, initially adopted in 1914 following the tragic sinking of the RMS Titanic, is a comprehensive international maritime treaty designed to establish minimum safety standards for ship construction, equipment, and operation. Over the years, SOLAS has undergone amendments to address evolving safety needs in the maritime industry. The convention primarily applies to ships with a gross tonnage of 500 and above, as well as specific categories like passenger ships on international voyages. Smaller vessels may comply with SOLAS voluntarily and a small number of diving liveaboards do comply with SOLAS (Figure 1).

However, it is crucial to recognize that national standards for smaller vessels vary significantly, leading to disparate safety levels. Even if some diving liveaboard vessel operators voluntarily operate SOLAS-compliant vessels, that does not necessarily mean that other operators’ liveaboard vessels in the same country will be SOLAS-compliant as well.
Should I feel concerned?
The bachelor thesis about diving liveaboard safety authored by Justus Schiszler, published by Kiel University of Applied Sciences, inter alia contains a statistical analysis. Here are some of the sobering findings (page 15):
The „Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2022“ of EMSA was used to classify casualties, as the Alliance does not deal with fatalities and injuries. This refers to ships flying the flag of a European Union (EU)-state, accidents within the waters of EU states or waters assigned to EU-states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or accidents in which EU-states have a high interest [51, p. 11]. This shows that an average of 70 people per year died in shipping accidents in the years 2014- 2022[51, p. 26]. With 2,647 accidents per year [51, p. 12], that is 1 death every 37.8 accidents. If the same calculations are made for liveaboard vessels, the result is 2 fatalities per accident if the „Conception“ is added. If this accident is not taken into account, the result is one death every 1.2 accidents. This indicates a considerable safety gap in liveaboard vessels.
In summary:
- 1 fatality every 37.8 accidents in shipping, for example cruise ships and container ships, which must all be SOLAS-compliant.
- 1.2 or 2 fatalities per accident in diving liveaboard vessels (depending on the exclusion/inclusion of the Conception accident)
This difference in the level of safety offered by shipping versus diving liveaboards is alarming.
Explore the map below showing liveaboard accidents from 2006-2023 grouped by the four leading possible causes: fire (red), running aground (green), stability issues (yellow), and flooding (blue). The accident locations are in most cases only approximate. More than one accident occurred at some locations so the markers had to be slightly moved to make all accidents visible.
The accident hotspots are in the Red Sea and in Southeast Asia. However, the deadliest accident since 2006 was the fire that occurred on Conception at Santa Cruz Island in 2019 with 34 fatalities. This is the only accident in this list for which an official marine accident report is publicly available. Whether and how the other accidents have been investigated by official institutions cannot be determined.
None of the vessels involved in these accidents was SOLAS certified. Most stakeholders seem to be apprehensive about publicizing such accidents as that may hurt tourism. This list is thus largely compiled based on press reports and is probably incomplete.
Non-compliance with appropriate safety standards is in many cases only apparent to experts with access to the ship’s documents. One such example is stability information about a ship. Unfortunately, many ships used as liveaboards never had stability calculations performed before or after their construction so their stability may be compromised much more easily than that of a ship constructed in accordance with pertinent international standards. A loss of stability can lead to capsizing and ultimately the sinking of a ship.
Nonetheless, there are some indicators for potential safety issues, which non-experts can detect. Such examples are:
- No safety briefing
- No abandon ship drill
- Expired or missing fire extinguishers
- Missing or inoperable smoke detectors
- Liferafts that are inappropriately mounted and not regularly maintained; no hydrostatic releases
- Liferings that are inappropriately stored, no attached light, no attached sea anchor, no attached smoke or smoke and light signal
- Inappropriate life vests
- Blocked emergency exits
- Emergency exits in unsuitable positions
- Missing handrails
- Missing safety-related radio equipment such as EPIRB (emergency satellite beacon), DSC marine radio, satellite phone, and AIS transponder
- Missing or improper anchors – essential safety equipment

The maintenance record of the liferaft in Figure 2 was not filled in and when this liferaft was last serviced can thus not be determined. Further, the weight belts used to hold the liferaft in place could prove problematic in an actual emergency as the buckles are hard to access and may not readily open under strain. Weight belts are not the right tool to fix a liferaft in place. A proper liferaft mount would, for example, be a cradle that secures the liferaft lashings secured by a pelican hook. A liferaft for 25 persons weighs about 115 kg with SOLAS-B pack for inshore use and about 180 kg with SOLAS-A pack for offshore use. The pelican hook ensures that the liferaft can be released under tension whereas the cradle allows rolling the container into the water without having to lift it. Further, a hydrostatic release should be installed to ensure that the liferaft is deployed automatically in case of sinking.

Figure 3 shows an appropriately mounted liferaft in a cradle ready to be deployed. It is attached with a pelican hook and hydrostatic release. Also note that the painter line is permanently attached to a weak link so that the liferaft is automatically inflated by tension on the painter line when the ship sinks once it is released by the hydrostatic release. The permanently attached painter line also ensures that the liferaft will not drift off once deployed. There is a cutting device in each liferaft to sever the painter line when necessary. The latest generation of liferafts is self-righting since righting a liferaft when it deploys upside down can be challenging.

The most essential feature missing from the life vest in Figure 4 is a flotation collar, which would keep the wearer’s head above the water even when unconscious. The buoyancy of this life vest may also not be adequate but that cannot be determined without further testing since its buoyancy is not labeled. 150 N of buoyancy should be considered the minimum for a life vest. A light, a whistle, and a crotch strap would also be sensible additions to a decent life vest.

The emergency exit in Figure 5 is located in the mirror above the sink in a passenger cabin. In an actual emergency, occupants would need to climb over the sink and squeeze through the small mirror opening to escape to the upper deck. This inconspicuous and challenging position could prove fatal in darkness and smoke when fast egress is vital.
This brief introduction shows the high level of complexity involved in ship safety. You can find the bachelor thesis previously referenced below to find out more about the current situation and potential ways to improve liveaboard safety.
Bachelor thesis
While SOLAS may not directly govern all liveaboard vessels globally, it serves as a benchmark for appropriate maritime safety standards. Vessel operators and authorities in regions with less stringent regulations should consider adopting practices that align with SOLAS principles to enhance safety in maritime operations. Most if not all existing vessels that do not comply with SOLAS cannot be retrofitted to comply with SOLAS due to substantial differences in construction requirements. However, an intermediate level of comprehensive safety standards that can be attained by such vessels would be a big step in the right direction.
In the long-term, it would be desirable for the dive industry to adopt SOLAS as the applicable safety standard for diving liveaboards globally, commensurate with their function as passenger vessel. In the meantime, divers can actively promote higher safety standards with their wallets by preferring vessels that comply with SOLAS.
Should you have information about other/new relevant accidents, please kindly get in touch using the details provided in the imprint.